In the ongoing conflict between Iran and its adversaries, a fascinating strategy emerges: a high-risk war approach centered on endurance and deterrence. This is not a conventional battle for victory, but rather a fight for survival on Iran's terms. The Islamic Republic's leaders and commanders have been meticulously preparing for this scenario for years, understanding the potential for direct confrontation with Israel or the US, and the subsequent involvement of the other. This was evident in the 12-day war last summer, where Israel's initial strike was followed by the US's entry into the conflict days later.
What makes Iran's strategy particularly intriguing is its focus on deterrence and endurance. Instead of seeking a straightforward battlefield victory, Iran has invested heavily in layered ballistic missile capabilities, long-range drones, and a network of allied armed groups across the region over the past decade. This strategy acknowledges Iran's limitations, recognizing that US mainland territory is out of reach, but American bases in neighboring Arab countries are not. Similarly, Israel, located within range of Iranian missiles and drones, has had its air defense systems penetrated in recent exchanges, each projectile carrying significant military and psychological weight.
Iran's calculus is also rooted in the economics of war. Interceptors used by Israel and the US are far more expensive than the one-way drones and missiles deployed by Iran. This forces the US and Israel to deplete their high-value assets to intercept these comparatively low-cost threats. Additionally, Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for oil and gas shipments, provides another lever in the war economy. Even credible threats and limited disruptions have already pushed prices up and may increase international pressure for de-escalation.
Attacks on neighboring countries, such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Iraq, serve as a signal that hosting US forces carries risks. Tehran may hope these governments will pressure Washington to limit or halt operations, but this is a dangerous gamble. Expanding attacks risks hardening hostility and pushing these states further into the US-Israel camp, with long-term consequences that could outlast the war itself, reshaping regional alignments in ways that leave Iran more isolated.
If survival is the primary objective, then widening the circle of enemies is a high-stakes move. However, from Tehran's perspective, restraint may also appear risky if it signals weakness. Reports of local commanders selecting targets or launching missiles with relative autonomy raise further questions. If accurate, this could indicate the decentralization of command structures, a strategy that has long been incorporated into Iran's military doctrine, particularly within the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), to ensure continuity under heavy attack.
This structure may explain how Iranian forces have continued to operate after the killing of senior IRGC figures and even after the killing of Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader and commander-in-chief, in the opening US-Israeli strikes. However, decentralization carries risks. Local commanders acting with incomplete information may strike unintended targets, including neighboring states that had sought neutrality. The absence of a unified operational picture increases the probability of miscalculation and could result in the loss of command and control.
Ultimately, Iran's approach appears to rest on the belief that it can absorb punishment for longer than its adversaries are willing to sustain pain and costs. If this is the case, then it is a form of calculated escalation: endure, retaliate, avoid total collapse, and wait for political fractures to emerge on the other side. Yet endurance has limits. Missile stockpiles are limited, production lines are under constant attack, and replacing mobile launchers takes time. The same logic applies to Iran's opponents, as Israel has not been able to rely completely on its air defense systems, and the US must weigh regional escalation, energy market volatility, and the financial burden of sustained operations.
In this war, the Islamic Republic does not need triumph; it needs to remain standing. Whether that objective is achievable without permanently alienating its neighbors remains the unanswered question.
